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Abstract We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary
contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-exam-
ple increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has
private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ
Rev 88:1188–1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627–657, 2003). In con-
trast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings
when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leader-
ship therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors
such as reciprocity.
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1 Introduction
In many naturally-occurring voluntary-contribution environments a leader can
choose her actions before others. For example, the leader of a work team can
choose her effort prior to other workers; a community leader may volunteer before
others; individuals may contribute to a charity before other potential donors; or
a nation may be first to commit to participation in an international environmen-
tal agreement. Field experiments suggest that contributions may increase when
a sequential mechanism is employed.1 The objective of the present paper is to
examine why the ability to “lead-by-example” may increase contributions.
One possible reason is that the leader’s action conveys relevant information to
followers. In particular a leader’s contribution may signal to followers that it is in
their interest to contribute as well. For example, in the case of team production
some workers may be better informed of the value of team output than others, and
likewise, in the case of charities, some donors may be better informed than others
of the value of their donations. Theoretical work has shown how, in the presence
of asymmetric information, leading-by-example can improve group performance
and enhance efficiency (Hermalin 1998; Vesterlund 2003).
In an environment where there is uncertainty about the quality of a public good
Potters et al. (2005) find that contributions to the public good are larger when
players move sequentially. While this result matches the signaling prediction, it
is also consistent with alternative explanations. In particular the outcome may
be the same when followers are reciprocal and mimic leader contributions. If a
leader anticipates such behavior, then even a self-interested leader may decide to
contribute although, in a simultaneous-move environment, she would not. Thus
reciprocity may cause larger contributions in the sequential- than simultaneous-
move game. Motives such as inequality aversion, prestige, or status may have
similar effects, as these too can cause followers to have upward sloping response
functions (Romano and Yildirim 2001).2 While signaling only can influence the
ability to lead-by-example when there is asymmetric information, reciprocity may
render leading-by-example effective in both an asymmetric- and full-information
environment. Since Potters et al. only examine an asymmetric-information setting
it is not possible to determine whether the substantial effect of leading-by-example
is caused by signaling or reciprocity.
Recent studies present mixed results on whether reciprocity causes leading-by-
example to be effective in full-information settings. In a public-bad setting Moxnes
and Van der Heijden (2003) show that the presence of a leader improves the overall
outcome, as the average extraction rates are significantly lower with sequential
than simultaneous moves. Meidinger and Villeval (2002) also conclude that rec-
1 Silverman et al. (1984) examine a national telethon and show that announcing the names of
individuals pledging money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater contributions.
List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) demonstrate that larger initial contributions increase subsequent
donations. Shang and Croson (2003) find that contributions increase with the size of the previ-
ously announced contribution. Soetevent (2005) finds that offerings for charitable purposes are
significantly higher when open rather than closed church collection baskets are used.
2 Kumru and Vesterlund (2004) investigate the effect of status on sequential giving.
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iprocity causes leading-by-example to be effective. In contrast, sequential moves
have not been found to increase contributions in a quasi-linear public good envi-
ronment (Andreoni et al. 2002) nor in a linear public good environment (Gaechter
and Renner 2003).
Using laboratory experiments we examine the effect of leading-by-example
in both an asymmetric- and full-information environment. If leading-by-example
is found to be equally effective under the two information treatments, then it is
likely that nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity can account for the increase
in contributions. If on the other hand sequential moves do not increase contribu-
tions in the full-information case then signaling is the more suitable explanation
for the success of leadership in the asymmetric-information case. By comparing
the sequential- and simultaneous-contribution games in both full- and asymmetric-
information environments we can identify the joint impact of asymmetric infor-
mation and sequential play.
We describe our basic model in the next section, our experimental design in
Sect. 3, and our results in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple model of leading-by-example
Our experiment is based on a simple voluntary contribution game. There are two
players, Leader (L) and Follower (F). Each player decides whether to contribute
(xi = 1), or not (xi = 0) to a group activity. The payoff functions are
πi = 1 − xi + m(xL + xF ), i ∈ {L , F},
where m is the private return (and 2m is the social return) from a contribution. The
value of m is drawn by Nature, and is equally likely to be either 0, 0.75, or 1.5.
A fully efficient outcome, in the sense of joint-payoff maximization, requires that
neither player contributes if m = 0 and both players contribute if m = 0.75 or
m = 1.5. To illustrate how the ability to lead-by-example affects contributions we
examine the equilibria that arise when the leader’s choice is or is not observed by
the follower.
Suppose both players observe m before making their choices, and that this is
common knowledge. In this full-information environment, regardless of whether
the leader’s choice is observed, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which no
player contributes if m = 0 or m = 0.75, and both players contribute if m = 1.5.
Thus, when m = 0.75 contributions are inefficiently low.
Now consider an asymmetric-information environment where the leader ob-
serves m prior to making her choice, but the follower only knows the distribution
of m, and that this is common knowledge. When players choose simultaneously
the follower makes his decision based solely on the distribution of m. With an
expected value of m of 0.75 a risk-neutral follower will choose not to contribute.
The leader, however, can condition her choice on the realization of m, and will
contribute if and only if m = 1.5. In this case, compared with the full-information
environment, there is an additional inefficiency because followers fail to contribute
when m = 1.5. Consider instead the sequential case where the leader chooses first,
and then, after observing her choice, the follower makes his choice. This structure
enables the follower to draw inferences about m from the leader’s decision, and
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Table 1 Equilibrium and efficient choices
m = 0 m = 0.75 m = 1.5
Full-info. equilibrium
Simultaneous xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 1
Sequential xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 1
Asymmetric-info. equilibrium
Simultaneous xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 0 xL= 1, x F= 0
Sequential xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 1 xL= x F= 1
Efficient choices xL= x F= 0 xL= x F= 1 xL= x F= 1
the leader will adjust her contribution decision in anticipation of these inferences.
In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this signaling game the leader con-
tributes if and only if it is efficient to do so (m = 0.75 or m = 1.5), and the
follower copies her action. Thus in the case of asymmetric information the ability
to lead-by-example increases both follower and leader contributions and a fully
efficient outcome is attained for every value of m. Table 1 summarizes the efficient
and equilibrium outcomes.
The dynamics of our model is similar to that of Hermalin (1998) and Vesterlund
(2003).3 Using perfectly revealing signals these models focus on the gain achieved
from revealing the signal to the follower (i.e., securing contributions when m = 1.5).
By restricting the available signals the efficiency gain in our model is even greater
as we also secure contributions when m = 0.75. Thus the equilibrium may be more
efficient with asymmetric rather than full information.4
Now we illustrate that sequential moves also may increase contributions when
individuals are motivated by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity or inequality
aversion. If the follower is motivated by reciprocity then he may interpret a deci-
sion by the leader to contribute as a kind act and a decision not to contribute as
an unkind act, and he may reciprocate this (un)kindness. If the leader anticipates
such a reciprocal response then the final outcome could be identical to that of the
signaling equilibrium.
A similar prediction arises if participants have inequality-averse preferences as
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).5 We assume for simplicity that preferences are com-
mon knowledge and that individuals only are averse to advantageous inequality,
i.e., a player’s utility is Ui = πi − βi max{πi − π j , 0}. To rule out signaling we
assume that both players observe m before making their choices, and we focus on
the case m = 0.75. Absent signaling, this corresponds to the follower’s expected
value of contributing in the asymmetric information case.
3 While Hermalin studies a team production model, Vesterlund examines a model of chari-
table giving. Although both models show that sequential moves may improve efficiency in an
asymmetric information setting, there are a number of differences. Perhaps most important is that
Hermalin does not allow for the possibility that contributions crowd out giving by others. While
there is no such negative correlation in our model it is present in a more general model of public
good provision. Indeed if one extends Hermalin’s model to such an environment then sequential
moves will often result in smaller contributions.
4 Komai (2005) examines a similar model.
5 A similar analysis could be performed using the social preference model of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). See Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) for a comparison of social preference mod-
els based on relative payoffs considerations and those based on (inferred) intentions.
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When both players are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality it may
be an equilibrium for both to contribute even when they move simultaneously. To
see this, suppose that the follower expects the leader to contribute. By contribut-
ing as well he will get utility 2m = 1.5; by not contributing he will get utility
1 + m − βF (1 + m − m) = 1.75 − βF . Contributing is optimal if βF ≥ 0.25.
Hence, a necessary condition for both players contributing to be an equilibrium
in the simultaneous game is that βF ≥ 0.25 and βL ≥ 0.25. This is not the only
equilibrium, however. Irrespective of the values of β it is always an equilibrium
for both players not to contribute.
The case for efficiency is considerably more favorable when players move
sequentially. First, the follower will mimic the leader’s decision to contribute when
βF ≥ 0.25. If the leader anticipates this, she will contribute irrespective of her level
of inequality aversion. Thus, only the follower’s degree of inequality aversion mat-
ters in the sequential game. Second, unlike the simultaneous game, the equilibrium
in which both players contribute is the unique equilibrium in the sequential game
when βF ≥ 0.25.
3 Experiment
We examined two-person simultaneous and sequential contribution games under
both asymmmetric and full information conditions. Thus the experiment consisted
of four different treatments. For each treatment we ran four sessions, with 12
subjects in each session, for a total of 192 subjects. Subjects were undergraduate
students at the University of Nottingham and randomly assigned to a treatment.
No subject participated in more than one session of the experiment.
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
assigned a computer terminal and given a role as Leader or Follower, which they
retained throughout the session.6 This allocation of roles was described in a set of
written instructions that the experimenter read aloud.7 As part of the instructional
phase, subjects completed a quiz on how to calculate the payoffs of the game, and
the experimenter checked that all subjects had completed the quiz correctly before
continuing with the instructions. Subjects were allowed to ask questions by raising
their hand and speaking to the experimenter in private. Subjects were not allowed
to communicate with one another throughout the session, except via the decisions
they entered on their terminal.
To provide subjects an opportunity to learn while capturing the one-shot nature
of the theory, the decision-making phase of the session consisted of 18 rounds in
which leaders were randomly and anonymously paired with followers. The random
pairing was done under the stipulation that no one played another subject twice
in a row, and that no pair of subjects would be matched more than three times.8
Subjects’ identities were never revealed to anyone.
In each round the subjects were given the choice between two actions: A or B.
Choosing A gave the individual a certain private return of 40 pence. Choosing B
6 The roles were labeled “first-mover” and “second-mover” in the instructions and software.
7 Reading the instructions aloud caused the information and move structure to become public
knowledge. A copy of the instructions can be found at http://www.pitt.edu/˜vester/.
8 The same randomly generated matching scheme was used in all sessions.
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gave both subjects a return of 0, 30, or 60 pence, where subjects were told each
value was equally likely. In terms of the model in Sect. 2, choosing A corresponds
to not contributing (xi = 0) and B corresponds to contributing (xi = 1). Subject
i’s payoff, in pence, was πi = 40(1− xi +m(xi + x j )), where m = 0, 0.75, or 1.5,
which corresponds to the payoff function of Sect. 2 after appropriate normalization.
In all treatments, at the beginning of each round leaders were informed of the
return from B and were prompted to choose A or B. When all leaders had chosen,
followers were either informed of the return from B (full-information treatments) or
told that each of the three values was equally likely (asymmetric-information treat-
ments). Similarly the follower was either informed of the leader’s choice (sequen-
tial treatments) or not informed (simultaneous treatments). The follower then chose
between A or B. 9 At the end of each round, subjects were informed of choices and
payoffs in their game, as well as the actual return from B, and they recorded these
on a record sheet.
For each session of the experiment a total of 108 joint decisions were made (6
pairs × 18 rounds). The corresponding sequence of 108 values of m was randomly
drawn prior to the experiment, with m = 0 being observed 34 times, m = 0.75 a
total of 39 times, and m = 1.5 a total of 35 times. This same sequence provided
the values of the return from B for all sessions.
At the end of the experiment subjects were paid their earnings from all 18
rounds in private. All sessions lasted less than an hour and subjects earned an
average of £ 11.52 (with a minimum of £ 6.90 and a maximum of £ 13.80).10
4 Results
In our analysis of the results we report on the effect of leadership first in the asym-
metric information environment and then in the full-information one.11
4.1 Asymmetric information
The evidence from the asymmetric-information treatments strongly supports the
prediction that revealing the leader’s choice increases contributions. In the sequen-
tial treatment total contributions are 50% larger than those observed in the simul-
taneous treatment.12 This increase in contributions is significant whether we look
at all rounds or just the first nine or last nine rounds.13
9 Note that all sessions have sequential moves in the sense of priority in time.
10 At the time of the experiment the exchange rate was approximately £1 = $1.45.
11 Part of the data from the asymmetric-information condition is also presented in Potters et al.
(2005). While the purpose of that study was to determine whether sequential moves arise endoge-
nously, a comparison of behavior between the endogenously-generated and exogenously-imposed
games was included to determine how sensitive behavior is to the pre-play signals involved in the
endogenously-generated games. Here we focus exclusively on exogenous games and provide a
more detailed analysis of differences between the sequential and simultaneous move treatments.
12 Average group contributions per session are 117.25 in the sequential treatment, and 76.75 in
the simultaneous treatment. The maximum feasible contribution is 216, and the efficient contri-
bution is 148.
13 In all three cases p = 0.0143. All of our results are unchanged whether we base the analysis
on first nine, last nine, or all rounds, and so in the rest of the paper we only refer to analysis
based on all rounds. Unless otherwise noted all reported test statistics refer to Wilcoxon rank-sum










Fig. 1 Leader contribution rates under asymmetric information
What causes contributions to increase? The answer is twofold. First, in the
sequential treatment the follower is very likely to mimic the decision of the leader.
Second, the leader appears to correctly anticipate this response.
In the sequential treatment followers mimic a contribution by the leader 80.6%
of the time, and they mimic the leader’s decision not to contribute in 92.2% of the
cases. Using a binomial test we find that followers are significantly more likely to
contribute when leaders contribute.14 Although followers mimic leaders’ decisions
less than the 100% predicted by equilibrium, it is still sufficient to make contribu-
tions at m = 0.75 the expected payoff-maximizing strategy for the leader. Given a
return of m = 0.75 a payoff-maximizing leader should contribute if she believes
that doing so will increase the probability that the follower contributes by at least
33.3%-points. Since in our data a leadership contribution increases the follower’s
contribution rate by 72.8%, it is in the leader’s best interest to contribute.
The leaders’ behavior suggests that the vast majority correctly anticipate the
follower’s response. Figure 1 displays leader-contribution rates when faced with
a given value of m. For both the sequential and simultaneous treatments lead-
ers almost never contribute when m = 0, and they almost always contribute when
m = 1.5. As predicted the noticeable difference between the two treatments occurs
when m = 0.75. When m = 0.75 we see a signifciant increase in leader contribu-
tion rates from 15% with simultaneous moves to 75% with sequential moves (exact
one-sided p-value equals 0.0143). Thus, in the asymmetric-information environ-
ment leaders are more likely to make efficient decisions when their decisions are
observed by followers.
Does observing the leader’s contribution cause followers’ decisions to be more
efficient? Figure 2 displays follower–contribution rates conditional on m. For com-
parison, the contribution rates for the simultaneous treatment are also shown. In
the sequential treatment, where leaders contribute more often when the return is
high, the uninformed followers can, by mimicking the leader, limit their ineffi-
cient contributions (m = 0), and increase their efficient contributions (m = 0.75
tests applied to session level data (i.e., aggregating data within a session and treating it as one
independent observation). See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for a discussion of this test.
14 In all four sessions of the sequential treatment there is a (strong) positive correlation between
leader and follower choices. Thus, the test rejects the null hypothesis that followers are not influ-
enced by the leaders’ decisions in favor of the (one-sided) alternative that followers’ contributions
increase with leaders’ (p = 0.0625). See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for a discussion of this test.










Fig. 2 Follower contribution rates under asymmetric information
or m = 1.5).15 Thus, as with leaders, followers’ contributions are more efficient
under the sequential mechanism. It is not only efficient for followers to mimick
the leader, it is also in their best interest to do so. When the leader contributes,
followers on average earn 91.0 pence when contributing as well, and 85.9 pence
when not contributing. When the leader does not contribute, followers earn 40
pence when mimicking the leader, but only 12.9 pence when contributing.16
Combining the leader and follower decisions we see that the sequential mech-
anism improves group welfare.17 This is because combined contributions are sig-
nificantly higher when m = 0.75 or 1.5, and significantly lower when m = 0.18
Table 2 summarizes earnings in the two treatments. Observed earnings are 91% of
the predicted efficient level in the sequential treatment. The primary reason earn-
ings fall short of the efficient level is that followers occasionally fail to contribute
when m = 0.75 or 1.5. In the simultaneous treatment followers earn close to what
is predicted, while leaders earn more than predicted. The discrepancy in the simul-
taneous treatment is caused by followers contributing about one third of the time.
While each unpredicted follower contribution decreases the follower’s earnings by
10 pence, it increases that of the leader by 30 pence.
Though joint payoffs are higher than predicted in the simultaneous treatment
and lower than predicted in the sequential treatment, our results are still consistent
with the comparative static prediction that both players enjoy higher earnings when
the leaders’ choices are observed.
The results from the asymmetric-information treatments demonstrate that in
the sequential mechanism leader contributions induce followers to contribute too.
This gives leaders an incentive to contribute when they otherwise would not (i.e.,
15 Relative to the simultaneous sessions, contribution rates in the sequential sessions are always
lower when m = 0 and higher when m = 0.75 or m = 1.5. Thus, follower decisions are in all
three cases significantly more efficient in the sequential game (one sided p-value = 0.0143).
16 In equilibrium a leader’s contibution indicates that the public good’s value equals either 30 or
60 pence, thus in equilibrium the gain from mimicking a leader’s contribution is 12 (30+60)−40 =
5 pence. If the leader instead does not contribute it indicates that the value of the public good is
0, and thus the follower may gain 40 pence by not contributing.
17 Leader-earnings are significantly higher in the sequential treatment, as are follower-earnings,
and combined earnings. In all three cases the one-sided p-values are 0.0143.
18 In all three cases the one-sided p-values are 0.0143.
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Table 2 Average earnings (£) per subject
Leaders Followers Efficiencya
Sequential
Predicted 13.2 13.2 100
Observed 11.7 12.3 91
Simultaneous
Predicted 8.4 10.7 72
Observed 10.1 10.4 78
aEfficiency is defined as joint earnings as a percent of maximum possible earnings
when m = 0.75). Consequently, both leaders and followers are better off, and
leading-by-example improves group performance.
4.2 Full information
Signaling is one explanation for the difference between the sequential and simul-
taneous treatments with asymmetric information. As illustrated above there are
however alternative explanations. If the follower is sufficiently motivated by social
preferences then he may mimic a contribution by the leader, and this provides the
leader with an incentive to give. To assess whether social preferences drive the
results in the asymmetric-information treatment, we examine the effect of sequen-
tial moves in an environment with full information.
Consider first behavior when m = 0 and m = 1.5, where we do not expect
social preferences to have much impact. Independent of the sequence of moves no
participant should contribute when m = 0, and indeed of the 272 such decisions
only five deviate in the simultaneous games and just one in the sequential games.
When m = 1.5 payoff maximization and efficiency dictates that both subjects
contribute, and of the 140 games there are only six deviations in the simultaneous
games and ten in the sequential games. 19 Independent of the sequence of moves
behavior in the full-information treatment at m = 0 and m = 1.5 is consistent with
the equilibrium prediction.
As argued in Sect. 2, to investigate the effect social preferences may have on
the ability to lead-by-example, we need to focus on the case where m = 0.75. First,
absent signaling this corresponds to the follower’s expected value of contributing
in the asymmetric-information case, second, this is the situation where social pref-
erences may cause sequential moves to increase contributions and efficiency in the
full-information game.
There is strong evidence of reciprocal behavior in the sequential game. Con-
ditional on the leader contributing, the follower contributes in 33.3% of the cases,
whereas the follower never contributes when the leader does not contribute.20 In
19 Every one of the ten sequential deviations is characterized by the leader not contributing.
Absent a leader contribution a payoff-maximizing follower should still contribute, however that
did not happen in four of the ten cases. While these cases are rare, it is noteworthy that followers
only deviate from payoff maximization when the leader fails to contribute. An aversion to (dis-
advantageous) inequality may explain why some followers prefer an outcome where each player
earns 40 pence to one where the leader earns 100 pence and the follower earns 60 pence.
20 The degree of reciprocity is consistent with that of previous studies. When m = 0.75 the
sequential full-information game reduces to a sequential prisoners dilemma. Examining such a










Fig. 3 Leader contributions rate under full information
fact, leader and follower choices are positively correlated in all four sessions of the
sequential full-information treatment, and so a Binomial test rejects the null hypoth-
esis that followers are not influenced by leaders’ decisions in favor of the (one-
sided) alternative that followers’ contributions increase with leaders’ (p = 0.0625).
Whether the amount of reciprocation is large or small is a matter of interpre-
tation. The crucial consideration in our game is whether the leader in contributing
triggers a sufficient follower response to make it profitable for her to contribute.
With the leader’s contribution increasing the chance a follower contributes by a
third, this precisely outweighs the cost of contributing, and a risk-neutral leader
will be indifferent between contributing and not.
This raises the question of whether the leader is affected by her contribution
being observed. Figure 3 shows the leaders’ contribution rates conditional on m and
the sequence of moves. As noted earlier, independent of the sequence of moves
leaders generally contribute when m = 1.5 and don’t contribute when m = 0.
In the case where m = 0.75 leader contributions are significantly larger in the
sequential (27%) than simultaneous treatment (16%).21
Although, sequential moves increase the leader’s contribution when m =
0.75, the increase in leader contributions is much smaller than in the asymmetric-
information treatments where contributions increased from 15 to 75%.
Sequential moves cause an insignificant increase in the leader’s overall contri-
bution rate from 38 to 40% (one-sided p = 0.1714), and the effect on efficiency
of the leader’s choice is also limited: in the sequential treatment 71% of leaders’
choices correspond to the efficient choice, compared with 69% in the simultaneous
treatment. In contrast sequential moves increase the leader contribution rates from
38 to 58% in the asymmetric treatment, and the efficient leader choices increases
from 69% (simultaneous) to 89% (sequential).
The leader’s behavior greatly influences the likelihood by which the follower
chooses the socially optimal outcome. Since leaders contribute 27% of the time
when m = 0.75, and followers mimic the leader’s contribution one-third of the
game when m = 0.8, Clark and Sefton (2001) find that followers are more likely to contribute
when the leader contributes (37%) than when she does not (3%). In spite of procedural differences
between our studies, the degree of reciprocity is nonetheless very similar.
21 The one-sided p-value is either 0.0571 or 0.0286, depending on how one breaks a tie between
one of the sequential sessions and one of the simultaneous sessions in which leaders contribute
in exactly 7 of 39 cases.










Fig. 4 Follower contribution rates under full information
time, the follower’s contribution rate at m = 0.75 is reduced to 9% in the sequential
treatment.22 In contrast followers contribute 27% of the time in the simultaneous
treatment (see Fig. 4). Thus, when there is full information and m = 0.75 the ability
to lead-by-example causes a decrease in follower contributions and an increase in
leader contributions.23 This differs substantially from the asymmetric information
case where, when m = 0.75, sequential moves cause follower–contribution rates to
increase from 29 to 64%. Independent of m in the full-information case sequential
moves significantly decrease follower contribution rates from 42 to 35% (one-sided
p = 0.0571). The follower’s percentage of efficient choices also decreases, while
72% were efficient in the simultaneous treatment, that only holds for 66% of the
sequential ones. This is in sharp contrast to the asymmetric information case where
sequential moves increase follower contribution rates from 34 to 50%, and improve
the efficiency of the followers’ choices (43% simultaneous vs. 77% sequential).
The net result is that with full information neither total contributions nor earn-
ings are significantly different under sequential and simultaneous mechanisms.
Average total contributions per session are lower in the sequential treatment (80.75)
than simultaneous treatment (86.50), however this difference is not significant.24
Similarly we see that while sequential moves cause a small decrease in leader
earnings and a minor increase in follower earnings, neither of these differences are
significant (two-sided p-values are 0.1143 and 0.3429, respectively). The net result
is a minor and insignificant decrease in combined earnings (two-sided p = 0.6857).
Thus, in the full-information environment, the ability to lead-by-example does not
improve group outcomes.
An interesting prediction of our model is that given sequential moves the imper-
fectly revealing signals cause efficiency to be greater in the asymmetric- than
22 In comparison in a sequential prisoners dilemma game where m = 0.8 Clark and Sefton find
that leaders contribute 32% of the time, and followers 14% of the time.
23 The follower’s mimicking of the leader’s decision helps explain both of these changes. On
one hand the follower’s mimicking causes the leader’s incentive to give to be greater in the
sequential than simultaneous move game. On the other hand, with leaders contributing 27% of
the time and followers conditioning their contribution on that of the leaders, follower contribu-
tions are smaller in the sequential game. Van der Heijden et al. (2001) find a similar effect in a
gift exchange experiment.
24 Depending on how one splits the ties the two-sided p-value ranges from 0.4857 to 0.8857.
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full-information environment. While the earnings differential is consistent with
this prediction the difference is not significant (two-sided p = 0.6857).
In summary, we observe evidence of reciprocation. However, our data also
show that sequential moves are nevertheless ineffective in increasing overall con-
tributions and earnings when both players know the value of contributing. This
suggests that it is unlikely that social preferences drive the leading-by-example
effect evident in our asymmetric-information treatment.
5 Conclusion
Our experiment strongly supports the theoretical prediction that leading-by-
example improves group performance in the presence of asymmetric information.
When an uninformed follower cannot observe the choice of an informed leader,
the follower rarely contributes, and the leader only contributes when it is privately
optimal for her to do so. In contrast, when an uninformed follower can observe the
choice of an informed leader, he tends to copy the leader’s decision, and the leader
tends to contribute when it is collectively optimal to do so.
Relative to previous signaling experiments it is striking how well subject behav-
ior accords to the equilibrium predictions. For example, in the entry limit pricing
game of Cooper et al. (1997) play consistently starts off with the first mover choos-
ing her myopic maximum, i.e., the choice that maximizes her payoffs if she ignores
the effect her choice has on that of the second mover. Similarly the second mover
typically starts off at the myopic maximum, ignoring the information that is con-
tained in the first mover’s choice. Only with sufficient repetition does play converge
to equilibrium in their experiment.
In our asymmetric-information sequential treatment strategic behavior devel-
ops almost immediately and is stable. If the leader anticipates that the follower
mimics her choice she should contribute when the return is 0.75, but if she ignores
this response she should not contribute (not contributing is the myopic maximum).
In the first round leaders already contribute at a rate of 75% when they are con-
fronted with a return of m = 0.75. Similarly, the myopic maximum for the follower
is not to contribute. We find, however, that conditional on the leader contributing
followers contribute at a rate of 69% in the first round.25
One reason why equilibrium play develops rapidly in our experiment may be
that the equilibrium of the game is unique (see also Cadsby et al. 1990). Note how-
ever that uniqueness does not generally secure rapid convergence to equilibrium.
For example, the lemons market experiments with cheap talk in Forsythe et al.
(1999) are also characterized by a unique (pooling) equilibrium, yet play shows
only a very weak tendency to converge toward the equilibrium. Cason and Reynolds
(2005) also find that a unique perfect Bayesian Equilibrium lacks predictive power
25 A reasonable conjecture is that equilibrium play for the case m = 0.75 develops so well
in the present game because leaders experience the response of the follower relatively easily.
After all, leaders have a dominant strategy to contribute when m = 1.5 (irrespective of whether
they understand equilibrium play) and by doing so they automatically experience the followers
response to a contribution. We find little support for this conjecture, however. The first time a
leader is confronted with m = 0.75 they contribute at a rate of 62.5% when they have already
experienced that the follower contributes after a contribution, and contribute at a rate of 75.0%
if they do not yet have that experience.
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in a multi-round pricing game with asymmetric information. Another reason sig-
naling works so well in our experiment may be that the equilibrium is efficient,
implying that at equilibrium there is no conflict between individual rationality and
efficiency. Finally, a reason may be that in equilibrium, earnings are equally dis-
tributed between the two players. These characteristics are likely to enhance the
behavioral attraction of the equilibrium of our game.
These three factors, uniqueness, efficiency, and equity, may explain why the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept performs well in our experiment, whereas it
does not in the experiment of Meidinger and Villeval (2002) (their signaling game
is more complicated than ours and has multiple equilibria, none of which are effi-
cient, and none of which imply equal payoffs to the leader and follower).26 In our
view, the two experimental designs cover different aspects of leading-by-example.
Whereas their richer game is arguably closer to situations where repeated interac-
tion is commonplace, our simpler game with a random-matching protocol makes
it closer to the one-shot theoretical model.
Our results lend support to the theoretical contributions of Hermalin (1998) and
Vesterlund (2003) in that they empirically demonstrate that signaling can play a cru-
cial role in the success of leading-by-example. Our results also provide some broad
implications for theory beyond the literature on sequential voluntary contributions,
to the extent that they identify conditions under which the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium concept has good predictive power. Further research that systematically
varies the factors identified above may provide important stress tests for locating
the boundaries of the applicability of this equilibrium concept.
While the observed behavior is consistent with the signaling hypothesis, fol-
lowers who are motivated by social preferences may behave in a similar manner.
In our full-information sequential treatment we observe evidence of reciprocity,
consistent with numerous previous studies. However, the degree of reciprocity does
not lead to an increase in contributions over those observed in our simultaneous
treatment. The opportunity to lead-by-example fails to raise overall contributions or
earnings because when the opportunity is not taken, as is usually the case, follower–
contribution rates are even lower than in the simultaneous-move game. Our finding
that the move structure has no effect on overall contributions and efficiency in the
full-information environment suggests that signaling plays an important role in
explaining the success of leadership in the asymmetric-information environment.
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